from the lack of food. The Hungarian harvest of 1916 had been a calamitous failure ; 1917 did not make up the deficiency. Not only wheat but milk and meat were also becoming *In Austria* ^ scarcen The shortage contributed to the readiness of Austria to make peace. It was one of the decisive factors in her final surrender.

In the field her armies were still unbeaten on foreign soil when the collapse occurred. The turn of Germany was obviously coming. Germany was passing through the terrible " turnip winter."

£^L . Her potato crop had failed and the *Winter'* population had to fall back on turnips.

The food distributed per head in Germany during this winter had a calorific value of only half the minimum necessary to keep the population in health. We are told that by 1917 the output in the German mines and munition factories was suffering considerably as a result of the decline in the physical fitness of the workers.

It was becoming a war of starvation. In the end meagre and mean feeding at last subdued the spirit that had for four years of sanguinary battles proved indomitable on every battle front. Food in all the belligerent countries was therefore at the end of 1916 becoming a growing, and as it turned out, a paramount element in the chances of victory. They were all beleaguered nations.

So far in Britain, France and Italy, there was no

actual privation suffered by any section of the people owing to food shortage. The command of the sea was still in Allied hands and the corn lands of the earth were still open and available to Allied cupboards, not in sufficient quantities to fill them, but just enough to

Menace of the submarine